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Abstract— In this paper, we present some practical experience 
on implementing an alert fusion mechanism from our project. 
After investigation on most of the existing alert fusion systems, 
we found the current body of work alternatively weighed down 
in the mire of insecure design or rarely deployed because of 
their complexity. As confirmed by our experimental analysis, 
unsuitable mechanisms could easily be submerged by an 
abundance of useless alerts. Even with the use of methods that 
achieve a high fusion rate and low false positives, attack is also 
possible. To find the solution, we carried out analysis on a 
series of alerts generated by well-known datasets as well as 
realistic alerts from the Australian Honey-Pot. One important 
finding is that one alert has more than an 85% chance of being 
fused in the following 5 alerts. Of particular importance is our 
design of a novel lightweight Cache-based Alert Fusion 
Scheme, called CAFS. CAFS has the capacity to not only 
reduce the quantity of useless alerts generated by IDS 
(Intrusion Detection System), but also enhance the accuracy of 
alerts, therefore greatly reducing the cost of fusion processing. 
We also present reasonable and practical specifications for the 
target-oriented fusion policy that provides a quality guarantee 
on alert fusion, and as a result seamlessly satisfies the process 
of successive correlation. Our experimental results showed that 
the CAFS easily attained the desired level of survivable, 
inescapable alert fusion design. Furthermore, as a lightweight 
scheme, CAFS can easily be deployed and excel in a large 
amount of alert fusions, which go towards improving the 
usability of system resources. To the best of our knowledge, 
our work is a novel exploration in addressing these problems 
from a survivable, inescapable and deployable point of view. 
Keywords-Alert fusion, Cache-based mechanism, Target-
oriented policy 
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of alert fusion techniques has 
significantly changed the troublesome job of analysing rough 
alerts, which originally belonged to network security 
administrators. However, most alert fusion systems 
themselves are not survivable because, for example, a job 
that comes across the alerts as overwhelming can barely 
survive from the tens of thousands of meaningful or 
meaningless alerts because the system does not have the 
efficiency to deal with it. We analysed this problem laterally 
by using two facts: (1) in some networks, the firewall is set 
to drop ‘ping’ packets and an inside IDS monitors its 
existence. We bypass the firewall and bomb the inside IDS 
with ‘ping’. In our experiment with one Snort deployed, the 
alert emission speed reached more than 100 pieces per 
second. (2) Some “IDS stress tools” like Stick [1] and Snot 
[2], produce IP packets capable of triggering rules from a 
spoofed IP range into a target IP range.  Stick is reported to 
be able to produce alerts at around 250 pieces per second. If 
this happens on a large-scale, the fusion phase could easily 
be overwhelmed by the emitted alerts without appropriate 
methods. 
Alert fusion approaches are generally deployed in a 
large-scale network environment. There exists a trade-off 
between scalability and complexity. We believe the reason 
for this is basically the low efficiency of alert fusion 
processing. As long as efficiency is supported, the conflict 
between scalability and complexity will be relieved. 
As summarized by Viinikka in [3], most approaches of 
alert processing aim to eliminate false alerts and/or adjust the 
alert priority using additional information. Like most aspects 
of network security, it is a case of attackers developing new 
methods and defenders developing new countermeasures 
against these attacks. Once these countermeasures become 
accepted practice, the attackers develop counter-
countermeasures, ad infinitum. The sticking point is the 
existence of a threshold. Most mechanisms implicitly have a 
presupposition (except for some statistical methods applied 
in algorithms like [3] and absolute fusion and correlation like 
[4]). Drawing lessons from game theory [5], attackers are not 
thought to be stupid because they will not launch attacks 
using pre-arranged routes. 
A serious approach to the problems above, involves 
satisfying the survivable, inescapable properties as well as 
being easily deployed within the aimed system. In the alert 
fusion field, this task may intuitively develop in fusion 
efficiency. As far as we know, there are few papers that deal 
with this as a whole. In this paper, we make this our concern. 
We firstly analysed the alerts from traditional and 
classical security datasets (Darpa datasets [6], Defcon 8 & 10 
[7], Treasure Hunt [8]). One interesting pattern we found 
was that an alert had more than an 85% chance of being 
fused in its successive 5 alerts. The probability reached more 
than 90% in 10 successive alerts. This interesting 
phenomenon indicates that most of the alerts are consecutive 
in time as well as compact in position. It is similar to the 
application of a cache mechanism in a CPU and Operation 
System. We believe it is possible to introduce this 
mechanism into an alert fusion. 
We explored the existence of a pattern resembling cache 
in a realistic network environment. However, when the alerts 
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were collected, the fusion process should have followed an 
alert fusion policy which was a set of matching rules. To deal 
with the problem of evading possibility, we designed a 
simple but more effective method: target-oriented policy. 
The alerts were mainly clustered as long as they satisfied the 
requirements of duplicated category and co-operating 
category (having same destination and attack type). 
Our work contributes to improving the survivable status 
of the fusion system. This is mainly through the cache-based 
design for efficient promotion and reasonable fusion. Our 
work also contributes to simple target-oriented policy, which 
brings the assurance of a more suitable and reasonable 
output, especially in accordance with the state machine 
correlation because the whole system performs well in its 
inescapable nature. A further contribution of our work is a 
lightweight scheme for large-scale intrusion alert fusion. The 
structure of CAFS is a simple two-layer cascaded fusion in 
which the first layer fuses alerts of single IDS and the next 
layer mainly acts as a collector and relay. The cache-based 
and target-oriented mechanisms were applied in CAFS. With 
significant decreases in efficiency and complexity, we think 
this lightweight fusion engine is more suitable to be used on 
most occasions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 elaborates on the 
analysis of alerts, which is the basis of this paper. Section 4 
presents CAFS, which is simple, efficient and scalable in 
most applications. Section 5 reports on our experiments, and 
Section 6 concludes this paper and points to future research 
directions. 
II. TYPE STYLE AND FONTS
The process of EMERALD [9] implemented a 
‘probabilistic’ alert fusion engine. Instead of using a large, 
crisp time-window, in another paper [10], the same authors 
advocated the use of fuzzy intervals. Thomas and 
Balakrishnan [11] addressed the trade-off between the 
detection rate and false alerts. They found the performance 
of the detector was better when the fusion threshold was 
determined according to the Chebyshev inequality. Readers 
can find similar research on the application of probabilistic 
methods in [12] and [13]. 
Another representative method is the slicing of alerts into 
several categories. Oliver Dain [14] assigned each of these 
alerts to one of five categories: discovery, scan, escalation, 
DoS, and stealth. Herve Debar [4] arranged intrusion alerts 
to be aggregated into seven situations. Zhichun Li [15] 
constructed the decrease key on the basis of DoS attack, port 
scan, virus, worms and botnets. Our work differs to these 
researchers in the idea of organized categories. The target-
oriented policy has the rationality in a semantic description 
of targets’ state switch. 
The signal processing method was used in alert fusion as 
demonstrated by Viinikka [16]. The approach detailed in [3] 
constructed alert time series by counting the number of 
events occurring in fixed-size sampling intervals. K. Julisch 
[17, 18] reported that 99% of the alerts produced by IDSs 
could be false positives. Devi Parikh [19] proposed a pattern 
recognition approach to minimize the cost of errors but did 
not consider reducing the error rate itself. 
Furthermore, there are other fusion methods that used 
special frameworks. The fusion method of P2P was used by 
Indra [20] who utilized Pastry and Scribe while Domino [21] 
utilized Chord. Centralized architecture was used in DIDS 
[22], EMERALD [9] and SOCBox [20] with alerts collected 
directly from IDSs. 
A distributed framework method was used by Min Cai 
[23] who introduced a DHT-based overlay network to defend 
against flooding. Zhichun Li [15] used the same method as 
Cai, but Li embeded the intrusion symptoms into the DHT 
dimensions so that alerts related to the same intrusion could 
be routed to the same sensor fusion center with a good load 
balance. LarSID [24] defended against attacks by sharing 
potential evidence of intrusions between participant IDSs via 
DHT. The work of Ming Xu [25] was similar to the work of 
Zhichun Li, but he differed in the details of the route 
mechanism in his approach. 
III. ALERTS ANALYSIS
A. Cache-based Mechanism in Datasets 
In the analysis of our experiments, we installed the Snort 
(version: 2.8.0.2; rules: snortrules-snapshot-2.8) on the 
computer and used the ‘replay’ operation to analyze the 
Fig. 1. Fusion proportions of each dataset in different ranges. 
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classic datasets. All the records were replayed through the 
Snort, and as a result, the alerts of datasets were stored in the 
“c:\ids\snort\log\alert” file.  In further analysis, we adopted 
the regular expression to divert each part of one alert, and 
processed the content in the memory. Put simply, the alerts 
were combined if they had the same equivalent sources, 
targets and alert types. This was the most basic policy for 
fusion. The goal was to test the spatial and temporal 
properties of the alerts. We kept a sliding window to 
organize the fusion process. Below are the three definitions 
for the analysis: 
Definition 1 (Fusion Range) 
Suppose there are two alerts: alert A and alert B. When 
alert fusion is processed linearly, fusion range is defined as 
the number of alerts between A and B. 
Definition 2 (Fusion Quota) 
Suppose there are only X and Y alerts left after the fusion 
process. We also suppose R as the number of alerts fused in 
range N. The fusion quota in Figure 1 is defined as (1). Its 
denominator denotes the total number of alerts which have 
been fused. 
)2()1(
X
R
YX
R

Definition 3 (Fusion Proportion) 
Table I uses (2). This indicates how many alerts the 
fusion in range N has fused. 
We calculated the fusion quota from range 1 to range 10. 
According to each dataset, the results were presented as Bars 
respectively. The values in Figure 2 indicate two facts: a) the 
fusion quota occupies the total alert fusion to a share of 
more than 90% in range 10; b) we can define a watershed 
in range 5, because after that point, the ascending curves 
of the fusion quota slope gently. Figure 1 clearly depicts 
the tendency of fusion proportions, in correspondence of 
which Table 1 exhibits the statistics of this fusion process. In 
“FP-10”, almost all alert fusion proportions reach a value of 
more than 80%. These values approach the values in “MFP”. 
Note that the MIT DARPA 1999 dataset is an exception, as 
its fusion extent reaches just 73% in range 5 and 78% in 
range 10. However, the tendency resembles the others. It 
could also reflect the similar nature of alerts as well. 
These interesting natures remind us of the cache 
mechanism in CPU and storing management in operation 
systems. Scientists have proven that commands can be 
invoked in the nearby storing space, in order to introduce the 
cache, which has a higher read/write speed, into the CPU. 
The cache stores the nearby commands and applies the LRU 
(Least Recently Used) algorithm for refreshing the data. 
According to the above discussion, we think the cache 
mechanism can also be applied into intrusion alert fusion. 
One of our intentions in our experiment was to build a 
survivable system. We believe the promotion of fusion 
efficiency can be beneficial when too many alerts arrive 
suddenly. When related to the cache-based mechanism, the 
alerts will primarily search for fusion within the cache range 
rather than the whole alerts storage, therefore becoming 
more feasible for alert fusion. 
B. Analysis in Campus Network 
The In our experience, IDSs are generally deployed 
inside the network, using a by-pass tunnel right behind the 
firewall. The firewall is configured to drop ’ping’ packets. 
However, we opened the detection of ‘ping’ packets within 
the IDS to monitor those which shouldn’t have appeared 
inside the network. During the investigation, we built such 
an environment in our campus network and adopted the 
‘ping’ packets to bomb the network from inside (we 
estimated the attacker found a method to neglect the 
firewall). 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF ‘PING’ BOMBING
Packets 1×103 1×104 1×105 1×106 2×106 3×106 4×106 5×106
Duration 0.1009 1.1858 2.1468 105.3263 217.0402 343.0195 564.1152 601.4484 
Alerts 1994 12922 16298 26410 39877 49871 59249 76901 
MSAE* 104.95 109.51 109.28 105.57 103.56 102.19 107.73 102.01 
MSAE (Maximum Speed of Alert Emission) pieces/second 
TABLE I 
Statistics of alert fusion results 
Defcon 10 Defcon 8 Darpa 1998 Darpa 1999 
MIT 2000 Treasure 
hunt Orange Red Test  Training Scene 1 Scene 2 
Alerts 43632 6404 1223280 102779 1686 119968 4676 1511 7488035 
Duration 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 weeks 4 hours 2 weeks 3 hours 3 hours 4 hours 
MFP* 92.13% 97.52% 98.31% 98.20% 97.45% 96.17% 93.41% 89.68% 99.99% 
NAF * 3436 159 20707 1845 43 4596 308 156 732 
FP-1* 13.91% 30.18% 35.80% 86.18% 69.63% 31.51% 66.85% 71.67% 1.67% 
FP-5 76.78% 92.49% 93.88% 93.59% 91.56% 73.20% 87.25% 84.71% 97.47% 
FP-10 87.52% 95.13% 96.95% 94.98% 95.97% 78.50% 89.56% 85.51% 99.86% 
MFP = max fusion proportion (without the consideration of range) 
NAF = number of alerts after fusion 
FP-Number = fusion proportion-the range number 
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We used the tool of “IP-Traffic” [26] to create ‘ping’ 
packets. TCP/IP sent out ‘ping’ packets using best-of-effort 
mechanism. We recorded the duration of alert emission of 
Snort. The whole experiment contained eight procedures 
with different quantities of packets and durations. The alert 
emission speed was calculated by the duration divided the 
quantity of alerts. Table II comprises the results of this 
analysis. We can see the alert emission speed reached more 
than 100 pieces per second. The rule of Snort for the 
detection of ‘ping’ was in “snort/rules/icmp-info”. Suppose 
in a large-scale environment, an attacker launched ’ping’ and 
flooded the whole network where several IDSs existed. The 
fusion center then received strengthened alerts flooding, and 
as a result the rendezvous point was easily overwhelmed if 
no counter-solution was adopted. In this situation, cache-
based mechanism ran pretty well because only a few alerts 
was produced by perceiving the repeated ones. 
C. Cache-based Mechanism in Australian Honey-pot 
We further investigated the alerts from the Australian 
honey-Pot where Snort was deployed. The rules used were 
from “Oinkmaster” [27]. These rules were a collection of 
free rules that we could get from the Snort community. 
Firstly, we fused the alerts by the same policy used in our 
previous analysis. The alerts were combined if they had the 
same equivalent sources, targets and alert types. Subplot A 
of Figure 2 shows the results. Unfortunately, only 22.69% 
of the alerts could be clustered within range 10. The reason 
for this was that the Australian Honey-Pot was designed to 
suffer mostly from DoS attacks. The attackers frequently 
changed the source IP addresses and ports of the packets, 
and as a result, the alerts emitted by Snort contained 
different sources. When we adopted the more reasonable 
target-oriented policy for the fusion analysis, the results 
improved a lot, which was depicted in subplot B of Figure 
2. In fact, we were able to gain a better fusion result after a 
little calibration on the “Oinkmaster” rules. 
We also checked its emission speed of alerts which were 
counted for each hour during a 6-month period (one hour 
interval was the same with [3]). As we can see in the subplot 
C of Figure 2, on most occasions, alert emissions were 
sparse except one situation of value 240. The related alert is : 
COMMUNITY WEB-MISC mod_jrun overflow attempt  2009-11-11 
20:30:55  138.77.2.133:53546  192.168.1.2:80  TCP 
This alert came up when certain web applications occur, but 
in general it was just a warning for us to check the system to 
see if anything had compromised it. The rule itself could be 
“#” out as lots of security experts do; but for us in the 
Australian Honey-Pot, we set it. In the experiment, this alert 
was produced at six to ten pieces per second. The result was 
not good enough to prove the worth of using cache-based 
mechanisms, but it showed the promise of using this utility 
when deployed in reality. 
D. Target-oriented Policy 
As we described before, the aim of our project was to 
build an inescapable system. To achieve this, we adopted a 
state machine to correlate the alerts into scenarios. The best 
aspect of this design was the real-time descriptions for the 
status of victims, which led to the attackers hardly avoiding 
correlation by stealthy attack (i.e. multi-step attack). No 
matter when the attackers launch the next stage of an attack, 
the state machine records the current status of victims. 
This correlation method however, needs the accurate 
expression of a current attack. Unfortunately, during the 
analysis process, we found the current fusion was 
ambiguous. For example, many alerts could be clustered as 
scan category due to the same source. Meanwhile, some of 
them could also be fused with other alerts for a DoS attack 
because they have the same destination. Besides, 
sophisticated attackers often adopt an IP-Spoof to avoid 
detection. Stealthy attacks like botnet can conceal their real 
sources, making the source properties of alerts not reliable at 
all. Moreover, current fusion policies simply fuse alerts in 
fixed durations. This durations resembling expert knowledge 
have an inherent drawback that they are not stable and 
different conditions decide different values. Even in the same 
scenario, the duration varies from the beginning to the end, 
let alone in slow attack. As we can see in subplot A of Figure 
2, general policy cannot fuse the alerts efficiently. The 
reason was that attackers continuously switched their source 
IP when they launched the attack, so that alerts from Honey-
Pot had different sources and could not be fused together. 
To facilitate the alerts analysis, we simplified the IDMEF 
[28] (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) to a 
structure in Figure 3 and classified fusion cases into 4 
categories: Duplicated Category, Scan Category, Co-
operating Category and Sequence Category. The ambiguity 
exists in the scan category and co-operating category. We 
detail the ambiguity in a scenario: The headquarters 
Fig. 3. Alert structure. 
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Fig. 2. Honey-Pot alerts (A: general fusion policy; B: target-oriented policy; C: alert emission speed). 
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organizes several attackers to scan an adverse network for 
vulnerabilities. The alerts contain the same Alert Type and 
Source IP. They can be clustered by a scan category. 
Meanwhile, if the scan traffic is heavy, the attack could be 
considered a DoS attack. This could be clustered by a co-
operating category because some alerts have the same Alert 
Type and Dest IP.
To address these problems, we designed a target-oriented 
policy, where alerts were fused when duplicated or the co-
operating category was satisfied, which meant Alert Type
and Dest IP and Port were same. This method could 
seamlessly collaborate with the next correlation phase. The 
aim of the correlation analysis is to identify multi-step 
attacks which present a series of actions. The alerts of each 
step denote the current state of the victim. To comply with 
the requirement of correlation, the alert fusion should be 
circumfused with targets. Furthermore, the source 
information could be concealed, forged, changed, or 
unknown, while the victim information cannot. When 
victims suffer intensive attack like DoS, the target-oriented 
policy helps the fusion to be more efficient. As indicated in 
subplot B of Figure 2, the efficiency greatly improved when 
we clustered the alerts of the Honey-Pot by target-oriented 
policy. We believe the fusion rate be better when the policy 
was deployed in other real environments. 
IV. ALERT FUSION ARCHITECTURE
According to the analysis above, we proposed CAFS: a 
novel cache-based alerts fusion scheme. It is simple but very 
effective to be deployed in most occasions. We also applied 
target-oriented mechanism as the alerts fusion policy. As is 
depicted in Figure 4, this scheme is composed of three 
levels: IDSs, preprocessing component and fusion server. 
The first level is composed of IDSs. It produces hundreds 
of thousands of alerts. As is declared in section II-B, the 
fusion quota occupies the total alerts fusion to a share of 
more than 90% in range 10. Therefore, for the release of 
overhead in the fusion server, we installed one preprocessing 
component of fusion after each IDS. The intention of this 
had two aspects: standardizing the alerts format and 
decreasing the useless alerts quantity. With cache-based 
mechanism and target-oriented policy applied, the alerts 
from IDSs were pre-fused by the preprocessing component. 
Actually, this is easy to be implemented in snort. Snort could 
configure the customized output component in the 
“snort.conf” file. 
We implemented the CAFS linearly. Look at Figure 4, 
when an alert is received from IDS, it will be inputted to the 
Fusion Waiting Queue. Then, this alert compares the first 
alert of Fusion Queue. If the comparison satisfies the 
duplicated or cooperating category, they are fused under the 
target-oriented policy. If the comparison doesn’t satisfy the 
categories, the alert searches match of alerts one by one until 
the fusion range reaches. Similar to the LRU algorithm in 
operation systems, because this alert has an 80% probability 
to be fused in the next round, this fused alert will be moved 
to the front of the Fusion Queue. We define this as LMHP 
(Latest Matching Highest Priority) algorithm. 
V. EXPERIMENT
A. For Survivability 
We have implemented all the techniques we discussed in 
this paper. In our implementation, we used C++ as the 
programming language, and Microsoft SQL Server 2000 as 
the database to store the fused alerts. 
In CAFS, the alerts emitted from IDSs will be sent firstly 
to preprocessing component for pre-fusing. The output is 
then processed together in the fusion server for 
comprehensive fusion. At last, the fused alerts are stored in 
database, waiting for correlation analysis and responses. In 
another side, traditional centralized architecture delivers the 
alerts to the fusion server directly, which dramatically 
aggravates the overhead of centralized server. For 
survivability test, we proved its validity through the 
comparison of fusion durations between CAFS and 
traditional centralized scheme. If the duration was shorter 
than traditional centralized scheme, it proved CAFS was 
more efficient and survivable. 
The fusion durations were recorded in the Table III by 
seconds. We found CAFS were better in an extent of 10% 
more or less. Even when the quantities of alerts became 
more, the decrease percentages of fusion durations became 
larger. We believed this was because the fusion server had an 
initializing process time, which had been included in the 
whole value. 
B. For Inescapability 
The second test we performed validated the correctness 
of the target-oriented policy. We investigated the original 
alerts of the Australian Honey-Pot and further checked each 
alert after fusion. The quantity of alerts was 4,787 and after 
fusion the quantity of alerts rose to 3,287 when the fusion 
range was set to 10. During our observations, we found the 
result of fusion was reasonable except on one occasion. The 
automatic attack tools have the ability to switch the source 
LMHP: Latest Matching Highest Priority 
The alerts are fused if either duplicated or cooperated relation is satisfied.
Fig. 4. Scheme of Alerts Fusion. 
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ports and change the speed of packet emission. The Snort in 
the honey-pot emitted a lot of alerts have different source 
ports. We calibrated our design and avoided the appearance 
of such cases. Table IV shows the results after calibration. 
The fusion rate reached more than 90% after range 2, which 
is in concert with the classical datasets. This proves the value 
of cached-based mechanism from another point of view. 
C.  For Deployment 
We calculated the maximum number of IDSs for 
deployment. Take our PCs for example; we recorded the 
fusion durations and the quantities of alerts. The speed for 
alert fusion was then evaluated to be more or less 40,000 
pieces/second. We introduced 103 pieces/second as a round 
evaluation. This meant the PC could endure alerts emitted 
from 400 IDSs in traditional centralized architecture. With 
cache mechanism applied, it could process ten times more, 
which was 4000 IDSs. We declared that the evaluation was 
based on experiential computation, which did not take other 
parameters into consideration. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented several interesting 
designs in our project of alert fusion and correlation. Our aim 
was to implement a survivable, inescapable and deployable 
system. With the introduction of a cached-based mechanism 
and target-oriented fusion policy, our system attained 
significant improvements to achieve our original intention. 
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TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF FUSION DURATIONS (SECOND)
Defcon 10 Orange Defcon 8 MIT 98 Test part MIT 99 Test part Treasure Hunt
NOA* 43632 1223280 102779 119968 7488035
1st 41.848 38.447 813.116 707.056 68.808 62.370 73.278 65.898 4912.807 4218.459 
2nd 41.054 38.299 822.926 713.374 69.009 62.241 72.787 65.720 4997.356 4297.244 
3rd 41.262 38.331 817.045 705.166 68.782 61.987 74.142 65.301 4943.427 4243.831 
Rate 7.319% 13.350% 9.681% 10.576% 14.098% 
Gray Area: traditional centralized fusion scheme.  NOA: number of alerts. 
White Area: CAFS.     Rate: the decrease percentage of fusion durations.
TABLE IV 
CALIBRATION OF ALERT FUSION ON THE AUSTRALIAN HONEY-POT
Range 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Fusion Rate 75.73% 90.39% 92.97% 93.69% 94.22% 94.49% 94.73% 94.75% 95.00% 95.00% 
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